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Blomquist: The Jurisprudence Of American National Security Presiprudence

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF AMERICAN
NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIPRUDENCE
Robert F. Blomquist*
I. INTRODUCTION
The President of the United States, by virtue of the Presidential Oath
Clause in Article II, Section 1 of the Constitution (in conjunction with
specific executive powers set forth in Article II), is the national security
sentinel of the Nation.1 By virtue of the Presidential Oath that the
President-to-be must take before assuming the office—“to preserve,
protect and defend” the Constitution, and by implication, the Nation2 —
the President has the paramount federal responsibility to articulate,
safeguard, and watch over the American national interest.3 I have
previously suggested that, by analogy to existing scholarly fields of
endeavor that attempt to systematize and critique the coherence and
robustness of the judiciary’s legal work product (jurisprudence) and the
legislature’s legal work product (legisprudence), it is appropriate to bring
similar focus on the legal work product of the President—what I call
presiprudence.4 In another article, I argued that presidents in the postProfessor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School
(1977); B.S., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School) (1973). I am grateful to the
participants in International Law in the Domestic Context at the Valparaiso University
School of Law Conference who provided useful feedback on a paper that I presented on
this topic.
1
The unique Presidential Oath is specifically prescribed in U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
Key specific executive powers relevant to the President’s national security powers are: U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United
States of America.”); art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the
Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States . . . .”); art. II,
§ 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make
Treaties . . . .”); art. II, § 3 (“he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”); art.
II, § 3 (“he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all
the Officers of the United States”).
2
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7.
3
Robert F. Blomquist, The Presidential Oath, the American National Interest and a Call for
Presiprudence, 73 UMKC L. REV. 1, 51 (2004), cited in McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545
U.S. 844, 886 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
4
Blomquist, supra note 3, at 50–52.
The presidential oath is properly understood as the constitutional
keystone of the American Republic: it commands the President of the
United States to preserve, protect and defend—as well as articulate,
pursue, and achieve—the legal embodiment of the American national
interest. A new field of inquiry, which I have coined presiprudence, may
help scholars elaborate theoretical insights on the President’s pursuit
of the legal national interest.
Id. at 52.
*
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9/11 world should pursue a vigorous and proactive maximum-security
American state limited by constraints of economics, psychology, politics,
and law.5 As part of that effort, I proposed a four-part model of
American national security presiprudence (involving timing, grand
strategy, communication, and balance).6
In this Essay I seek to explore some issues of interaction between
jurisprudence and presiprudence in the context of American national
security.
In Part II, I catalog and discuss various theoretical
considerations regarding how the Supreme Court of the United States
should go about reviewing and interpreting national security legal
determinations by the President of the United States (“POTUS”). Then,
in Part III, I focus on whether the Supreme Court should ever cite foreign
law when reviewing national security presiprudence.
II. NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIPRUDENCE JURISPRUDENCE
A. Strategic Considerations of Institutional Design Coupled with Form and
Function
Supreme Court Justices—along with legal advocates—need to
conceptualize and prioritize big theoretical matters of institutional
design and form and function in the American national security tripartite
constitutional system. By way of an excellent introduction to these vital
issues of legal theory, the Justices should pull down from the library
shelf of the sumptuous Supreme Court Library in Washington, D.C. (or
more likely have a clerk do this chore) the old chestnut, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by the late Harvard
University law professors Henry M. Hart and Albert M. Sacks.7 Among
the rich insights on institutional design coupled with form and function
in the American legal system that are germane to the Court’s
interpretation of national security law-making and decision-making by
the President are several pertinent points. First, “Hart and Sacks’
intellectual starting point was the interconnectedness of human beings,
and the usefulness of law in helping us coexist peacefully together.”8 By
implication, therefore, the Court should be mindful of the unique
5
Robert F. Blomquist, American National Security Presiprudence, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV.
439 (2008), reprinted in TOP TEN GLOBAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 2008, at 55 (Amos N.
Guiora ed., 2009).
6
Id. at 491−95, reprinted in TOP TEN GLOBAL JUSTICE LAW REVIEW ARTICLES 2008 55,
104−05 (Amos N. Guiora ed., 2009).
7
HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
8
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Interpretation of Statutes, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 200, 203 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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constitutional role played by the POTUS in preserving peace and should
prevent imprudent judicial actions that would undermine American
national security. Second, Hart and Sacks, continuing their broad
insights of social theory, noted that legal communities establish
“institutionalized[] procedures for the settlement of questions of group
concern”9 and regularize “different procedures and personnel of
different qualifications . . . appropriate for deciding different kinds of
questions”10 because “every modern society differentiates among social
questions, accepting one mode of decision for one kind and other modes
for others—e.g., courts for ‘judicial’ decisions and legislatures for
‘legislative’ decisions”11 and, extending their conceptualization, an
executive for “executive” decisions.12 Third, Professors Hart and Sacks
made seminal theoretical distinctions between rules, standards,
principles, and policies.13 While all four are part of “legal arrangements

HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 3.
Id. at 4.
11
Id. at 360. Interestingly, Hart and Sacks make a distinction between adjudicative facts,
“facts relevant in deciding whether a given general proposition is or is not applicable to a
particular situation (that is, facts ordinarily, although not always, about what happened in
the particular case),” and legislative facts, “facts relevant in deciding what general
propositions should be recognized as authoritative (that is, facts, ordinarily, although not
always, about what generally happens in a class of cases).” Id.
12
I contend, by extrapolating Hart and Sacks’ typology, that it is appropriate to
distinguish presiprudential facts—facts relevant in deciding what general propositions,
recognized as authoritative, are of such importance at a given time for the paramount
national interest so as to require special executive arrangements to ensure their expeditious
achievement. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. Moreover presiprudential facts
would also encompass general propositions that are not yet recognized as authoritative,
but that in the President’s judgment, should be recognized as authoritative for the
paramount national interest. While any substantive area of domestic law and policy (e.g.,
environmental, energy, education, health) or international law and policy (e.g., trade,
diplomacy, war) is potentially subject to presiprudential fact–finding, national security law
and policy is of unusual importance because of the special constitutional responsibility of
the president to preserve, protect and defend the Nation. See supra notes 1–6 and
accompanying text.
13
HART & SACKS, supra note 7, at 139 (rules); id. at 140 (standards); id. at 141–42
(principles and policies). Congress might prescribe rules, standards, principles and policies
for the President to consider in executing national security. But the relatively abstract and
generalized nature of congressional principles and policies is a more likely legal
arrangement as addressed to the President to consider in executing national security,
because of the more complex quality of national security issues, the independent
constitutional power of the President in national security matters and the need for dispatch
in responding to national security emergencies. Moreover, because of the President’s
independent constitutional power in national security affairs, it is likely that the President
will on his or her own initiative develop or direct the promulgation of national security
principles and policies or even national security rules and standards to guide the discretion
of civilian and military officials under presidential command.
9

10
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in an organized society,”14 and all four of these arrangements are
potentially relevant in judicial review of presidential national security
decisions, principles and policies15 are of special concern because of the
sprawling, inchoate, and rapidly changing nature of national security
threats and the imperative of hyper-energy in the Executive branch in
responding to these threats.16
The Justices should also consult Professor Robert S. Summers’s
masterful elaboration and amplification of the Hart and Sacks project on
enhancing a flourishing legal system: the 2006 opus, Form and Function
in a Legal System: A General Study.17 The most important points that
Id. at 141.
According to Hart and Sacks:
Principles and policies are closely related, and for many purposes
need not be distinguished from each other. A policy is simply a
statement of objective. E.g., full employment, . . . national security,
conservation of natural resources, etc. . . . . A principle also describes a
result to be achieved. But it differs in that it asserts that the result
ought to be achieved and includes, either expressly or by reference to
well-understood bodies of thought, a statement of the reasons why it
should achieved. E.g., pacta sunt servanda agreements—should be
observed; no person should be unjustly enriched; etc. . . . .
Policies usually have reasons behind them, but they are likely to
be less closely thought out and justified. At least in the extremes and
for some purposes, there seems to be a significant difference between a
mere statement of objective, which may be a matter of unreasoned
preference, and a statement that a certain objective ought to be sought
or a certain course of action followed, which necessarily involves a
rationale founded on human experience of why this is so.
Principles and policies, like rules and standards, are general
directive propositions, or elements of them. But unlike rules and
standards they are not expressed in terms of the happening or nonhappening of physical or mental events or of qualitative appraisals of
such happenings drawn from ordinary human experience. They are
on a much higher level of abstraction, and obviously involve a vastly
larger postponement of decision. A policy leaves to the addressee the
entire job of figuring out how the stated objective is to be achieved,
save only as the policy may be limited by rules and standards which
mark the outer bounds of permissible choice. A principle gives the
addressee only the additional help of a reason for what he is to try to
do.
Id. at 141–42.
16
See generally JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR
PERILOUS TIMES (2007) (discussing how the United States faces the threat of catastrophic
terrorist attacks and whether the Nation is successful in preventing nuclear, biological or
other security breaches depends especially on the POTUS and POTUS advisers applying
and making law in a manner that enhances security and upholds our core constitutional
values).
17
ROBERT S. SUMMERS, FORM AND FUNCTION IN A LEGAL SYSTEM: A GENERAL STUDY
(2006).
14
15
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Summers makes that are relevant to judicial review of American national
security presiprudence are three key considerations. First, a “conception
of the overall form of the whole of a functional [legal] unit is needed to
serve the founding purpose of defining, specifying, and organizing the
makeup of such a unit so that it can be brought into being and can fulfill
its own distinctive role”18 in synergy with other legal units to serve
overarching sovereign purposes for a polity.
The American
constitutional system of national security law and policy should be
appreciated for its genius in making the POTUS the national security
sentinel with vast, but not unlimited, powers to protect the Nation from
hostile, potentially catastrophic, threats. Second, “a conception of the
overall form of the whole is needed for the purpose of organizing the
internal unity of relations between various formal features of a functional
[legal] unit and between each formal feature and the complementary
components of the whole unit.”19 Thus, Supreme Court Justices should
have a thick understanding of the form of national security decisionmaking conceived by the Founders to center in the POTUS; the ways the
POTUS and Congress historically organized the processing of national
security through institutions like the National Security Council and the
House and Senate intelligence committees; and the ways the POTUS has
structured national security process through such specific legal forms as
Presidential Directives, National Security Decision Directives, National
Security Presidential Decision Directives, Presidential Decision
Directives, and National Security Policy Directives in classified, secret
documents along with typically public Executive Orders.20 Third,
according to Summers, “a conception of the overall form of the whole
functional [legal] unit is needed to organize further the mode of operation
and the instrumental capacity of the [legal] unit.”21 So, the Supreme Court
should be aware that tinkering with national security decisions of the
POTUS—unless clearly necessary to counterbalance an indubitable
violation of the text of the Constitution—may lead to unforeseen
negative second-order consequences in the ability of the POTUS (with or
without the help of Congress) to preserve, protect, and defend the
Nation.22
Id. at 6.
Id.
20
BAKER, supra note 16, at 109.
21
SUMMERS, supra note 17, at 6.
22
Cf. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2279 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Today
the Court strikes down as inadequate the most generous set of procedural protections ever
afforded aliens detained by this country as enemy combatants. The political branches
crafted these procedures amidst an ongoing military conflict, after much careful
investigation and thorough debate. . . . And to what effect?”), with Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at
18
19
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B. Geopolitical Strategic Considerations Bearing on Judicial Interpretation
Before the United States Supreme Court Justices form an opinion on
the legality of national security decisions by the POTUS, they should
immerse themselves in judicially-noticeable facts concerning what
national security expert, Bruce Berkowitz, in the subtitle of his recent
book, calls the “challengers, competitors, and threats to America’s
future.”23 Not that the Justices need to become experts in national
security affairs,24 but every Supreme Court Justice should be aware of
the following five basic national security facts and conceptions before
sitting in judgment on presiprudential national security determinations.
(1) “National security policy . . . is harder today because the issues
that are involved are more numerous and varied. The problem of the
day can change at a moment’s notice.”25 While “[y]esterday, it might
have been proliferation; today, terrorism; tomorrow, hostile regional
powers”26, the twenty-first century reality is that “[t]hreats are also more
likely to be intertwined—proliferators use the same networks as narcotraffickers, narco-traffickers support terrorists, and terrorists align
themselves with regional powers.”27
(2) “Yet, as worrisome as these immediate concerns may be, the
long-term challenges are even harder to deal with, and the stakes are
higher. Whereas the main Cold War threat—the Soviet Union—was
brittle, most of the potential adversaries and challengers America now
faces are resilient.”28
(3) “The most important task for U.S. national security today is
simply to retain the strategic advantage. This term, from the world of
military doctrine, refers to the overall ability of a nation to control, or at
least influence, the course of events.”29 Importantly, “[w]hen you hold
2294 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s opinion plays upon
the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will almost certainly
cause more Americans to be killed. That consequence would be tolerable if necessary to
preserve a time-honored legal principle vital [to the Nation]. But it is this Court’s blatant
abandonment of such a principle that produces the decision today.”).
23
BRUCE BERKOWITZ, STRATEGIC ADVANTAGE: CHALLENGERS, COMPETITORS, AND
THREATS TO AMERICA’S FUTURE (2008).
24
Although, it wouldn’t hurt if the Justices regularly read national security journals
such as Foreign Affairs, The National Interest, The Journal of International Security Affairs, The
World Policy Journal, and Current History. While it seems unlikely, the POTUS and the
Congress should seriously consider changing laws and policies to provide Supreme Court
Justices with select national security briefings.
25
BERKOWITZ, supra note 23, at 1.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Id. at 1–2 (footnote omitted).
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the strategic advantage, situations unfold in your favor, and each round
ends so that you are in an advantageous position for the next. When you
do not hold the strategic advantage, they do not.”30
(4) While “keeping the strategic advantage may not have the
idealistic ring of making the world safe for democracy and does not
sound as decisively macho as maintaining American hegemony,”31
maintaining the American “strategic advantage is critical, because it is
essential for just about everything else America hopes to achieve—
promoting freedom, protecting the homeland, defending its values,
preserving peace, and so on.”32
(5) The United States requires national security “agility.”33 It not
only needs “to refocus its resources repeatedly; it needs to do this faster
than an adversary can focus its own resources.”34

Id. at 2.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
33
Id. at 4.
34
Id. By way of illustration, Berkowitz examines the “dozen or so events that were
considered at one time or another,” over the past fifteen to twenty years, “the most
pressing national security problem facing the United States—and thus the organizing
concept for U.S. national security.” Id. at 2. Remarkable strategic agility was required for
the POTUS, and other American national security officials under his command or direction,
to nimbly shift from one crisis to the next. These national security crises, in rough
chronological order, included the following:
•
regional conflicts—such as Desert Storm—involving the threat of war
between conventional armies;
•
stabilizing “failed states” like Somalia, where government broke down in
toto;
•
staying economically competitive with Japan;
•
integrating Russia into the international community after the fall of
communism and controlling the nuclear weapons it inherited from the
Soviet Union;
•
dealing with “rogue states,” unruly nations like North Korea that engage in
trafficking and proliferation as a matter of national policy;
•
combating international crime, like the scandal involving the Bank of Credit
and Commerce International, or imports of illegal drugs;
•
strengthening international institutions for trade as countries in Asia,
Eastern Europe, and Latin America adopted market economies;
•
responding to ethnic conflicts and civil wars triggered by the reemergence
of culture as a political force in the “clash of civilizations”;
•
providing relief to millions of people affected by natural catastrophes like
earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, droughts, and the spread of HIV/AIDS
and malaria;
•
combating terrorism driven by sectarian or religious extremism;
•
grassroots activism on a global scale, ranging from the campaign to ban
land mines to antiglobalization hoodlums and environment crazies;
•
border security and illegal immigration;
30
31
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As further serious preparation for engaging in the jurisprudence of
American national security presiprudence in hotly contested cases and
controversies that may end up on their docket, our Supreme Court
Justices should understand that, as Walter Russell Mead pointed out in
an important essay a few years ago,35 the average American can be
understood as a Jacksonian pragmatist on national security issues.36
“Americans are determined to keep the world at a distance, while not
isolating ourselves from it completely. If we need to take action abroad,
we want to do it on our terms.”37 Thus, recent social science survey data
paints “a picture of a country whose practical people take a practical
approach to knowledge about national security. Americans do not
bother with the details most of the time because, for most Americans, the
details do not matter most the time.”38 Indeed, since the American
people “do know the outlines of the big picture and what we need to
worry about [in national security affairs] so we know when we need to
pay greater attention and what is at stake. This is the kind of knowledge
suited to a Jacksonian.”39
Turning to how the Supreme Court should view and interpret
American presidential measures to oversee national security law and
policy, our Justices should consider a number of important points. First,
given the robust text, tradition, intellectual history, and evolution of the
institution of the POTUS as the American national security sentinel,40
and the unprecedented dangers to the United States national security
after 9/11,41 national security presiprudence should be accorded wide
latitude by the Court in the adjustment (and tradeoffs) of trading liberty
and security.42 Second, Justices should be aware that different presidents

•

the worldwide ripple effects of currency fluctuations and the collapse of
confidence in complex financial securities; and
•
for at least one fleeting moment, the safety of toys imported from China.
Id. at 2–3. See also THOMAS P.M. BARNETT, GREAT POWERS: AMERICA AND THE WORLD AFTER
BUSH (2009) (cogent synoptical analyses of rapidly emerging national security trends).
35
Walter Russell Mead, The Jacksonian Tradition, NAT’L INTEREST, Winter 1999/2000, at 5
(cited in BERKOWITZ, supra note 23, at 96).
36
BERKOWITZ, supra note 23, at 97–98.
37
Id. at 97.
38
Id.
39
Id. For an excellent human portrait of Andrew Jackson in the White House and a
lucid account of Jackson’s pivotal influence as an American leader who created an
enduring change in the presidency, see JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON
IN THE WHITE HOUSE (2008).
40
See Blomquist, supra note 5, at 441–57.
41
Id. at 457–75.
42
ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY, LIBERTY
AND THE COURTS 6 (2007) [hereinafter TERROR IN THE BALANCE]. See RICHARD A. POSNER,
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institute changes in national security presiprudence given their unique
perspective and knowledge of threats to the Nation.43 Third, Justices
should be restrained in second-guessing the POTUS and his subordinate
national security experts concerning both the existence and duration of
national security emergencies and necessary measures to rectify them.
“During emergencies, the institutional advantages of the executive are
enhanced”;44 moreover, “[b]ecause of the importance of secrecy, speed,
and flexibility, courts, which are slow, open, and rigid, have less to
contribute to the formulation of national policy than they do during
normal times.”45 Fourth, Supreme Court Justices, of course, should not
give the POTUS a blank check—even during times of claimed national
emergency; but, how much deference to be accorded by the Court is
“always a hard question” and should be a function of “the scale and type
of the emergency.”46
Fifth, the Court should be extraordinarily
deferential to the POTUS and his executive subordinates regarding
questions of executive determinations of the international laws of war
and military tactics. As cogently explained by Professors Eric Posner
and Adrian Vermeule,47 “the United States should comply with the laws
of war in its battle against Al Qaeda”—and I would argue, other lawless
terrorist groups like the Taliban—“only to the extent these laws are
beneficial to the United States, taking into account the likely response of

COUNTERING TERRORISM:
BLURRED FOCUS, HALTING STEPS 177 (2007) [hereinafter
COUNTERING TERRORISM]. Moreover:
We should also bear in mind the tradition of flexible interpretation of the
Constitution that permits judicial departures from, as well as judicial
elaborations of, the actual language of the document, and the balancing of
competing interests as a technique of flexible constitutional interpretation. We
should remember too that there is nothing novel or illiberal in trading liberty off
against safety. We do it all the time, for example in limiting the ownership of
guns or requiring seatbelts and infant seats in automobiles.
Id.
43
See, e.g., Paul Richter, Cheney: Obama Put U.S. at Risk, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2009, at 1
(“Since entering office, [President] Obama has announced plans to eventually close the
Guantanamo Bay detention facility; banned water-boarding, an interrogation technique
that makes a prisoner believe he is in imminent danger of drowning; said he would require
CIA interrogators to abide by rules in the Army Field Manual; and ordered the closure of
secret intelligence interrogation sites.”).
44
TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 42, at 5.
45
Id. But see Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess:
Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587 (2009) (criticizing a
broad spectrum of cases over the last several years decided by the Supreme Court acting as
a superlegislature devoted to the questionable role of making new law to govern future
events).
46
TERROR IN THE BALANCE, supra note 42, at 5–6.
47
See id. at 260–72.
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other states and of al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations,”48 as
determined by the POTUS and his national security executive
subordinates.
III. LEARNING FROM FOREIGN EXPERIENCE (BUT AVOIDING THE TEMPTATION
OF CITING FOREIGN CASES AS PRECEDENT)
Our Supreme Court Justices should carefully distinguish between
salutary and legitimate uses of apt foreign national security law and
policy, on the one hand, and problematic and illegitimate citation of
foreign judicial holdings as precedent.49 Salutary and legitimate uses of
relevant foreign national security law and policy by the Supreme Court
might include our Justices cogitating on: persuasive legal and policy
arguments contained in foreign judicial opinions; discussions of
international legal principles mentioned in foreign decisions; and
reflection on the substance, structure and wisdom of foreign national
security legislation and executive policies by way of edifying comparison
to American national security legislation and policy.50 Speaking, by
implication, to the POTUS, American legislatures, executive
policymakers, national security intellectuals as well as Supreme Court
Justices (and subordinate federal judges), Richard A. Posner persuasively
argues that Americans “should be able to learn, and benefit from
learning, how other democratic countries, especially those with more
experience than we have with terrorism, tailor their counterterrorist
measures. The literature is extensive and much of it in English.”51 He
goes on to suggest that “[w]ithout violating the letter or even the spirit of
our Constitution we could experiment with trying terrorists [like several
European countries do] in specialized courts or with using investigatory
magistrates empowered to compel testimony from suspected terrorists
under pain” of contempt of court sanctions.52 Likewise, Posner
summarizes pragmatic foreign legal counterterrorism measures gleaned
from the United Kingdom and Canada “from which we might want to
borrow ideas for combating terrorism more effectively,”53 or simply to
Id. at 261.
I am at work on a more extended and in-depth analysis of this problem in a draft
tentatively entitled The Constitutional Jurisprudence of American National Security
Presiprudence: The Folly of Supreme Court Citation of Foreign Judicial Precedent (on file with the
author). My thoughts in the present Essay are concise and impressionistic given the
limitations of space.
50
Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK, ch. 12 (2008) (for a discussion of these
and other comparative law judicial learning techniques).
51
COUNTERING TERRORISM, supra note 42, at 183 (footnote omitted).
52
Id. at 183–84 (footnote omitted).
53
Id. at 179, n.13.
48
49
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better understand the global context of national security law of other
democratic industrialized sister sovereigns. Nine ideas taken from the
United Kingdom’s playbook, as explained by Posner are:
(1) conducting criminal trials without a jury if there is
fear of jurors’ being intimidated by accomplices of the
defendant;
(2) placing persons suspected of terrorism under
“control orders” that require consent to being
questioned or monitored electronically or forbidden to
associate with certain persons, and that limit their travel;
(3) detaining terrorist suspects for up to [twenty-eight]
days (with judicial approval) for questioning, without
charges being lodged;
(4) conducting deportation proceedings from which the
alien and his lawyer may be excluded—the alien is not
entitled to be fully informed of the reasons for deporting
him; “his” lawyer is appointed by and, more important,
is responsible to the government rather than to the
defendant; and evidence that is classified may be
concealed from the defendant;
(5) indefinitely detaining aliens who have been ordered
deported but cannot actually be removed from the
country (there may be no country willing to take them);
(6) criminalizing persons who encourage terrorism by
“glorifying” it in words that imply that the listener
should engage in the glorified activity;
(7) authorizing the issuance of search warrants by
security officials rather than just by judges;
(8) conducting “traffic analysis” and other data mining
of Internet communications without a warrant (Internet
service providers are required to install devices to enable
Internet communications to be intercepted in transit); a
warrant must be obtained to read an intercepted
communication; but it may be granted by an executive
official rather than a judge;
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(9) Authorizing judges to issue “Public Interest
Immunity Certificates” to intelligence agencies, allowing
them to withhold from public judicial proceedings
highly sensitive information concerning informants or
techniques.54
To the contrary, citations by our Supreme Court Justices (and other
federal judges) to foreign holdings involving national security law and
policy (and related human rights jurisprudence) as precedent55 is
illegitimate and problematic for two sets of reasons. The initial set of
reasons against American Judicial citation of foreign precedents is
generic and has been articulated by Judge Posner.
First, citation of decisions opens up the promiscuous practice of
“troll[ing] deeply enough in the world’s corpus juris,” increasing “the
amount of research that lawyers and judges would have to do, but
without conducing to better decisions.”56 Second, citation of foreign
decisions by American jurists is really just “one more form of judicial figleafing” by judges “timid about speaking in their own voices lest they
make legal justice seem too personal,”57 involving a further mystification
of the judicial process in an effort to hide the real bases for difficult
decisions in politically-charged matters of national security law which
intersect with civil liberties law. Third, citation of foreign opinions has
the unattractive potential of opening up “a wasteful arms race” of
dueling foreign case citations between competing judges.58 Fourth,
“foreign decisions emerge from a complex social, political, historical, and
institutional background of which most of our judges and Justices are
ignorant.”59 Fifth, “[t]o cite foreign law as authority is to suppose
fantastically that the world’s judges constitute a single community of
wisdom and conscience,” that is simply not the case.60
Sixth,
“sophisticated cosmopolitans” as judges, with a desire to cite foreign
judicial precedents are “arrogant, even usurpative, in trying to impose
their cosmopolitan values on Americans in the name of our eighteenth-

Id. at 178–79 (footnotes omitted).
The most problematic use of a foreign decision would be citation of the decision as
precedent by federal judges “searching for a global consensus on an issue of U.S.
constitutional law.” POSNER, supra note 50, at 348.
56
Id. at 349–50.
57
Id. at 350.
58
Id. at 351 (quotation marks omitted).
59
Id.
60
Id. at 351–52.
54
55
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century Constitution” and complex political and legal culture.61 Seventh,
the constitutional and political incentives of foreign jurists are to issue
“audaciously progressive opinions”; yet, these incentives are
fundamentally different from American jurists.62 Eighth, “[t]he decisive
objection,” on a generic level, in Posner’s view, “to citing foreign
decisions as authority [by American judges] is the undemocrative
character of the practice” since “[t]he judges of foreign countries,
however democratic these countries may be, have no democratic
legitimacy in the United States.”63 Ninth, American jurists should not
confuse the largely harmless philosophical concept of cosmopolitanism—
learning from and being open to edifying knowledge from other lands—
with the dangerous and pernicious notion of judicial cosmopolitanism
(importing inappropriate and alien foreign case law into the finely-tuned
American political and legal system).64
A second set of reasons militating against precedential citation of
foreign case holdings is focused on national security presiprudence
considerations. First, unlike other national constitutions (e.g. Germany
and South Africa) that invite the reception of international and
comparative law in domestic courts, the American constitutional
tradition is much more conservative in allowing the use of foreign law
into our corpus juris.65 Second, ethos—what makes the American people
distinctive—is critical to the American constitutional system; foreign
court precedents in the realm of national security law are inapposite to
the unique national security ethos of the United States66 (a nation that
has and does bear a vast and disproportionate financial and human
burden of responding to aggressive wars and trying to maintain the
peace of the modern world). Finally, instead of seeking to hide from and
obfuscate the vexing legal issues in reviewing national security
presiprudence set in motion by the POTUS, Supreme Court Justices
should seek to apply and perfect the excellent and flexible corpus of
United States national security precedent.67
Id. at 352.
Id. at 352–53.
63
Id. at 353.
64
Id. at 361–62, 366.
65
See Jan M. Smits, Comparative Law and Its Influence on National Legal Systems, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 513, 513–30 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard
Zimmermann eds., 2006).
66
See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 170–72 (2008). See also Mark
Tushnet, Comparative Constitutional Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW
1225, 1255 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006).
67
See, e.g., Dep’t of the Navy v. Eagan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); United
States v. Curtis-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
61
62
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